SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Index No.:104713/08 COUNTY OF RICHMOND DCM PART 3 Motion No.:001 PATRICK MAIORINO Plaintiff against DECISION & ORDER PARK TYSEN ASSOCIATES, L.L.C. d/b/a HON. JOSEPH J. MALTESE TYSEN PLAZA SHOPPING CENTER; PIZZA HUT, INC. d/b/a PIZZA HUT; and YASMIN GEORGES Defendants The following items were considered in the review of this motion to amend summons and complaint and/or add parties Numbered Order to Show Cause Answering Affidavits Replying Affidavits Supplemental Affirmation Exhibits Attached to Papers
Absent a written agreement, a franchisor is not an agent for service for its franchisees nor
are they united in interest for the purpose of extending the service of process under NY CPLR §
Plaintiff Patrick Maiorino moves by order to show cause pursuant to CPLR §§ 305(c),
2001, 203(f) and 3025(f) to amend the summons by correcting the name of defendant “Pizza Hut,
Inc. d/b/a Pizza Hut” to “ADF Pizza I, LLC d/b/a Pizza Hut” (“Pizza Hut 2"). By the same order
to show cause, the plaintiff moves pursuant to CPLR § 203(c) to add Pizza-Hut 2 and Pizza Hut
of America, Inc. d/b/a Pizza Hut (“Pizza Hut-OA”) and Pizza Hut-OA as defendant parties
“united in interest” with defendant Pizza Hut, Inc. Lastly, the plaintiff moves pursuant to CPLR
§ 306-b to allow him the time to serve the summons and verified complaint beyond the 120-day
period. The plaintiff’s motion is denied in its entirety.
Factual and Procedural History
This action arises out of a motor vehicle collision involving the plaintiff and the
defendant Yasmin Georges, which occurred on November 27, 2005 in the shopping center
parking lot at or around 2712 Hylan Boulevard, Staten Island, New York. The plaintiff alleges
that defendant Park Tysen Associates, L.L.C. failed to place and/or properly place traffic control
devices and/or markings on the surface of the subject parking area. It is also alleged that Pizza
Hut, Inc., and/or Pizza Hut 2, and/or Pizza Hut-OA owned, operated, maintained, managed, or
controlled a portion of the subject parking area and permitted the placement of a dumpster that
obscured the view of oncoming motorists, including the plaintiff and defendant Yasmin Georges.
Pizza Hut, Inc. and Pizza Hut 2 signed a franchise agreement on August 25, 1999,
designating the former as franchisor and the latter as franchisee. Their franchise agreement reads
At all relevant times, the subject Pizza Hut restaurant has beenoperated by ADF Pizza I, LLC [Pizza Hut 2] under the Pizza Hut,Inc. Franchise Agreement (the “Franchise Agreement”). Under theFranchise Agreement and related Assignment of Lease, ADF PizzaI, LLC agreed to indemnify Pizza Hut, Inc . . . Defense counselshould be advised that PHI [Pizza Hut, Inc.] has no responsibilityfor the operation of any franchised restaurants [Pizza Hut 2].1
This action was commenced by the filing of the summons and verified complaint on
November 25, 2008, two days before the expiration of the three-year personal injury Statute of
Limitations.2 On December 1, 2008, the summons and verified complaint were served on Carol
Vogt, agent of Park Tysen Associates, L.L.C. Defendant Yasmin Georges was served on
December 2, 2008. On December 4, 2008, summons and verified complaint were served on Paul
Bregman, partner of the Bregman Organization, authorized to accept service for Park Tysen
Associates, L.L.C. Summons and complaint were served on Pizza Hut, Inc. on December 5,
2008 at 14841 Dallas Parkway Dallas, TX, 75254. Thereafter, Pizza Hut, Inc. forwarded a copy
of the summons and verified complaint, along with a letter dated December 8, 2008 to Pizza Hut
The plaintiff served a summons and verified complaint on Pizza Hut 2's general agent
Susan Scott at 350 Passaic Avenue, 2nd Floor, Fairfield, N.J. 07004 on March 23, 2009, Pizza
Hut 2's clerk Steve Pastore at 80 State Street. Albany, N.Y. on March 24, 2009, and agent Donna
Christie at the Office of the Secretary of State of New York on March 23, 2009. The plaintiff
served the summons and verified complaint upon Pizza Hut-OA through agent Donna Christie at
the Office of the Secretary of the State of New York on March 23, 2009.
By this order to show cause, the plaintiff intends to include Pizza Hut-OA and Pizza Hut
2 as parties in this action. Because the entities share a similar name and the plaintiff intended to
sue the Pizza Hut entity that maintains the subject parking lot, the plaintiff aims to amend its
summons to include Pizza Hut-OA and Pizza Hut 2, while keeping Pizza Hut, Inc. as a
defendant. Pizza Hut, Inc. was served within the deadline set by the Statute of Limitations.
Since Pizza Hut, Inc. forwarded the summons to Pizza Hut 2, the plaintiff contends that Pizza
Hut 2 was fairly appraised of the suit. The plaintiff also argues that notice upon the parties was
further provided when Pizza Hut-OA and Pizza Hut 2 were served in March 2009.
Alternatively, the plaintiff intends to add Pizza Hut-OA and Pizza Hut 2 by arguing that
they are parties united in interest in that they all do business as Pizza Hut and use the same logo,
and that Pizza Hut, Inc. and Pizza Hut-OA share the same executive offices at 14841 N. Dallas
Parkway, Dallas TX 75254. Therefore, the plaintiff claims that since Pizza Hut, Inc. was timely
served, Pizza Hut-OA and Pizza Hut 2 are united in interest and should be added to the action by
relating back to the date of the timely filed summons and verified complaint upon Pizza Hut, Inc.
According to CPLR § 214(6), a negligence action must be commenced within three years
of the date of the accident. As the Statute of Limitations in the instant action has expired, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish his entitlement to amend the summons or to add the
parties through the relation back doctrine. Amendment to the Summons Pursuant to CPLR § 305(c) CPLR § 305(c) allows the amendment of a summons outside of the Statute of
Limitations when there is a misnomer in the description of the party defendant, but not when it
adds a new, separate entity. To apply CPLR § 305(c), the plaintiff must provide: “(1) evidence
that the correct defendant (misnamed in the original process) has in fact been properly served,
and (2) that the correct defendant would not be prejudiced by granting the amendment sought.”3
The purpose of CPLR § 305(c) is to correct the terminology by which the plaintiffs have
incorrectly named the defendant, who was fairly appraised of the action against him, and not as a
mechanism by which a new entity is added.4
The application of CPLR §305(c) is only allowed in misnomers,5 but not in the addition
of distinct entities. The facts of this case significantly differ from Ober v. Rye Town Hilton,
where the plaintiff erred by naming defendant “Rye Town Hilton” when its proper name was
“Hilton Hotels Corporation a/k/a/ the Rye Hilton.” The New York Court of Appeals held that
the mistake was made merely on the trade name, as the served party had no independent
existence from the intended defendant. The instant matter does not simply involve a misnomer,
3 Ober v. Rye Town Hilton, 159 AD2d 16 [2d Dept 1990].
4 Id.; Kingalarm Distributors v. Video Insights Corp., 274 AD2d 416 [2d Dept 2000].
5 CPLR §305 (c); Gajdos v. Haughton El., 131 AD2d 428 [2d Dept 1987]; Matter ofGladding v. Board of Educ. of Kings Park Cent. School Dist., 136 AD2d 636 [2d Dept 1988].
but the addition of separate entities with independent existence of each other. The case at bar
also differs from Stuyvesant v. Weil where the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court had
acquired jurisdiction over a defendant who was called Mary J. Stockton, where the summons and
complaint named her as Emma J. Stockton.6 In determining whether the intended party received
a fair appraisal of the action, the Court noted that the defendant received the summons and
complaint but was just misnamed. In contrast to Stuyvesant, this Court finds that the summons
and complaint were served upon a completely different entity. On the other hand, the instant
action is more parallel to Ingenito v. Grumman Corp., where the intended defendant was
Grumman Aerospace Corp., but the summons and complaint named defendant “Grumman
Corporation.”7 The Appellate Division, Second Department denied the plaintiff’s motion
pursuant to CPLR § 305(c) because the summons named a distinct entity. Accordingly, this court
cannot allow the application of CPLR § 305(c) in the instant case because it involves the addition
of parties and not the correction of defendant’s name.
It is undisputed that Pizza Hut, Inc., Pizza Hut-OA, and Pizza Hut 2 are separate entities.
An examination of the franchise agreement reveals that Pizza Hut, Inc. and Pizza Hut 2 were
separate entities with only a business relationship, limited to their roles as franchisor and
franchisee.8 The franchise agreement clearly states that the franchisee was solely liable for its
wrongdoing and would have to indemnify the franchisor; as such, Pizza Hut, Inc. bears no
responsibility over Pizza Hut 2. Pizza Hut, Inc.’s lack of responsibility over Pizza Hut 2 is also
confirmed in the letter enclosed in the plaintiff’s moving papers. The Appellate Division, Third
Department in Potamianos v. Convenient Food Mart, established that franchisors and franchisees
are separate entities and confusing one from another does not constitute a misnomer for the
purposes of CPLR § 305(c).9 In Potamianos, the plaintiff moved to amend the summons to include
6 Stuyvesant v. Weil, 167 NY 421 .
7 Ingenito v. Grumman Corp., 192 AD2d 509 [2d Dept 1993].
9 Potamianos v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 197 AD2d 734 [3d Dept 1993].
the name of the franchisee, when she had only served the franchisor. The Third Department denied
the plaintiff’s motion to amend and observed that “until such time as she realized her error with
regard to defendant’s legal responsibility in this matter, plaintiff always intended to sue
defendant.”10 The facts of Potamianos mirror the facts of the instant case since the plaintiff intends
to add the franchisee when it had originally sued the franchisor, who does not share any
responsibility with the franchisee. Under the guidance of Potamianos and in accordance with
Pizza Hut, Inc.’s franchise agreement, this court denies the plaintiff’s motion to add Pizza Hut-OA
in pursuance to CPLR §305(c).
The plaintiff further argues that Pizza Hut 2 should be amended in accordance with CPLR
§ 305(c) because it received Pizza Hut, Inc.’s forward of the summons and was later served a
summons and verified complaint on March 23, 2009. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff
insists, Pizza Hut-OA and Pizza Hut 2 knew or should have known that the action would have
been brought to them as well. The Appellate Division, Second Department in Shapiro v.Schnoninger rejected a similar argument by holding that the required notice for proper service
can only be performed through service of original pleadings.11 Therefore, forwarding the
summons and complaint by Pizza Hut, Inc. to Pizza Hut 2 is not sufficient notice for purposes of
acquiring jurisdiction, absent an agreement where the franchisor was serving as an agent for
Adding Parties through the Relation Back Doctrine
The plaintiff alternatively aims to apply the relation back doctrine by adding Pizza Hut-
OA and Pizza Hut 2 because they are parties united in interest with defendant Pizza Hut, Inc.
CPLR § 203(b) allows a claim asserted against a defendant in an amended complaint to relate
back to claims previously asserted against a co-defendant when the Statute of Limitations has
11 Shapiro v. Schoninger, 122 AD2d 38 [2d Dept 1986].
expired. The plaintiff must establish that:
(1) both claims arose out of the same conduct, transaction, oroccurrence; (2) the new defendant is united in interest with theoriginal defendant, and by reason of that relationship can becharged with notice of the institution of the action such that he orshe will be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits; and(3) the new defendant knew or should have known that, but for amistake by the plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, theaction would have been brought against the new defendant aswell.12
The rationale behind the concept of unity of interest is that “parties are united in interest
when their interests in the subject matter is such that they will stand or fall together with respect
to the plaintiff’s claim.”13 “Timely service upon one of two such defendants gives sufficient
notice to enable him to investigate all the defenses which are available to both defendants within
the period of limitations. From this rule has evolved that where a defendant ‘may’ have a
defense which is not available to the other, they cannot be said to be united in interest.”14 In
determining whether parties are united in interest, courts must look at: “(1) the jural relationship
of the parties whose interests are said to be united and (2) the nature of the claim asserted against
In a negligence action, parties are held to be united in interest when one is vicariously
12 Shapiro v. Good Samaritan Regional Hospital Medical Center, 42 AD3d 443 [2d Dept
2007; Xavier v. RY Mgt. Co., Inc., 25 AD3d 677 [2d Dept 2007] [emphasis added].
13 Xavier v. RY Mgt. Co., Inc., 45 AD3d 677, supra; Hilliard v. Roc-Newark Assoc., 287
14 Connell v. Hayden, 83 AD2d 30 [2d Dept 1981].
15 Xavier v. RY Mgt. Co., Inc., 45 AD3d 677, supra; Hilliard v. Roc-Newark Assoc., 287
liable for the acts of the other16 and the defenses available to the defendants are identical.17 A
party is vicariously liable for the other if it exerts authority or control over the alleged
wrongdoer.18 “The mere existence of a parent-subsidiary corporate relationship is insufficient to
establish a unity of interest between the two corporations.”19 “In order for vicarious liability to
exist, ‘[t]he parent corporation must exercise complete dominion and control [over] the
The plaintiff proffers a printout from the New York Secretary of State website indicating
that Pizza Hut-OA’s address at 14841 Dallas Parkway, Dallas, TX, 75254, which is the same
address where the summons and complaint were served upon Pizza Hut, Inc. The Appellate
Division, Second Department in Xavier v. RY Management Company, Inc. held, however, that
the sharing of office space, or even employees, is not dispositive in the application of the relation
back doctrine.21 As such, the alleged sharing of the business address between Pizza Hut, Inc. and
Pizza Hut-OA does not translate into the application of the relation back doctrine.
The relation back doctrine requires that the parties share the same jural relationship. The
Appellate Division, Second Department in Connell v. Hayden analyzed the legislative history of
CPLR § 203(b) and concluded that a jural relationship was akin to the status of being “joint
contractors.”22 The Connell Court also confirmed that a unity of interest is a question of law and
16 Santiamagro v. County of Orange, 226 AD2d 359 [2d Dept 1996]; Gatto v. Smith-Eisenberg, 280 AD2d 640 [2d Dept 2001].
17 Connell v. Hayden, 83 AD2d 30, supra.
18 Hilliard v. Roc-Newark Assoc., 287 AD2d 691, supra.
19 Feszczyszyn v. General Motors Corp., 248 AD2d 939 [4th Dept 1998].
20 Id. [citing 14 NY Jur 2, Business Relationships, § 41, at 119].
21 Xavier v. RY Mgt. Co., Inc., 45 AD3d 677, supra.
22 Connell v. Hayden, 83 AD2d 30, supra. The predecessor to CPLR § 203 (b) is section
99 of the Code of Procedure of 1848 which stated in relevant part that: “An action is commenced
not of fact;23 in other words, the law determines whether a particular relationship is also a jural
relationship or that of “joint contractors.” Given the relation back doctrine’s legislative history,
it cannot be held that Pizza Hut, Inc. is a joint contractor with Pizza Hut-OA and Pizza Hut 2.
Pizza Hut, Inc. is a franchisor, holding its unique defenses that are not to be shared with the other
entities. As the unity of interest is a question of law and not of fact and case law establishes that
a franchisor and franchisee are separate entities,24 this court cannot apply the relation back
doctrine to either of the intended defendants.
The franchise agreement and the letter from Pizza Hut, Inc. to Pizza Hut 2 indicate that
the former is not vicariously liable for the latter, and the latter would have to indemnify Pizza
Hut, Inc. in the event of a claim. Although the plaintiff argues that the indemnification clause
means that Pizza Hut, Inc. and Pizza Hut 2 are protected by the same insurance carrier, the
plaintiff fails to provide any factual evidence or case law that gives rise to this assumption.
Moreover, in Hilliard v. Roc-Newark Association, the Appellate Division, Second Department
ruled that an indemnification provision regarding any claims arising out of the operation of a
business does not establish that the parties are united in interest.25 Hence, application of the
relation back doctrine is also improper in the instant matter because indemnification does not
No Extension of Time to Serve a Summons and Complaint
as to each defendant when the summons is served on him, or on a co-defendant who is a jointcontractor, or otherwise united in interest, which him” [emphasis added]. The Connell Courtnoted that the second annual report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure whichdeveloped the CPLR recommended that the term “join contractor” be dropped as an unnecessaryexample of a situation in which co-defendants are united in interest.
24 Potamianos v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 197 AD2d 734, supra.
25 Xavier v. RY Mgt. Co., Inc., 45 AD3d 677, supra.
Since neither the amendment to the summons and complaint pursuant to CPLR § 305(c)
and the relation back doctrine in accordance with CPLR § 203(b) can be granted to the plaintiff,
the plaintiff’s request to extend the limitation to serve summons and complaint pursuant to CPLRConclusion
Lastly, the plaintiff’s reply papers point out that the Malapero Law Firm, who drafted the
opposition to the plaintiff’s motion, does not represent Pizza Hut 2 nor Pizza Hut-OA. Indeed,
the plaintiff buttresses the fact that these parties are separate entities, rendering both CPLR §
305(c) and CPLR § 203(b) inapplicable because the plaintiff’s mistake in service did not involve
a mere misnomer, and because the parties are not united in interest.
ORDERED, that the plaintiff’s motion to amend summons pursuant to CPLR §§ 305(c),
2001, 203(f) and 3025(f) is denied; and it is further
ORDERED, that the plaintiff’s motion to add Pizza-Hut 2 as party defendant united in
interest with defendant Pizza Hut, Inc. is denied; and it is further
ORDERED, that the plaintiff’s motion to add Pizza Hut-OA as party defendants united in
interest with defendant Pizza Hut, Inc. is denied; and it is further
ORDERED, that the plaintiff’s motion for an extension to serve the summons and
verified complaint upon Pizza Hut 2 and Pizza Hut-OA pursuant to CPLR § 306-b is denied; and
ORDERED, the original parties in this action shall return to DCM Part 3 for a
Compliance Conference on September 10, 2009.
GERMAN ECONOMIC TEAM IN BELARUS 76 Zakharova Str., 220088 Minsk, Belarus. Tel./fax: +375 (17) 210 0105 E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org. Internet: http://research.by/ Public Private Partnership Summary In recent decades governments in most industrial and developing countries promote co-operation between the public and private sectors in providing public goods. This cooperation takes the
TRASTORNO DE LA CONDUCTA ALIMENTARIA ANOREXIA NERVIOSA – BULIMIA NERVIOSA CARRERA DE MEDICOS ESPECIALISTAS EN PSIQUIATRIA HTAL. DR. JOSE T. BORDA DIRECTORA: PROF. DRA. AMELIA MUSACCHIO DE ZAN AUTOR: OMAR ALBERTO CESTARO PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version INDICE Introducción Pág. 3 Desarrollo Pág. 5 Discusión Pág. 33 Conclusión Pág. 35 Biblio